This paper studies to what extent individuals form their preferences towards trade policies along the lines of the Stolper-Samuelson logic. We employ a novel international survey data set with an extensive coverage of high-, middle-, and low-income countries, address a subtle methodological shortcoming in previous studies and condition on aspects of individual "enlightenment". We find statistically significant and economically large Stolper-Samuelson effects. In the United States, being high-skilled increases an individual's probability of favoring free trade by up to twelve percentage points, other things equal. In Ethiopia, the effect amounts to eight percentage points, but in exactly the opposite direction.
Introduction
Low-and middle-income countries such as Brazil, China, India, and Russia have (re-)entered the stage of the world economy. These economies, home to a substantial portion of world population, show high degrees of trade openness and have recently boasted enormous output growth; see Freeman (2009, p. 63) . 1 The rapid integration of emerging markets into the global economy promises substantial gains from trade. Yet, these gains seem endangered by anti-free trade campaigns motivated by globalization fears. Can we explain this tension by the well-known Stolper-Samuelson arguments? From a neoclassical point of view, the new global economic architecture implies that developed economies like the United States or Europe import low-skilled labor from developing countries like China, indirectly, through the factors embodied in traded goods. This will result in changes of relative wages or unemployment, making the scarce factors worse off and benefitting the abundant factors. In this sense, economic theory fuels the public debate on the potential link between "globalization" and contemporaneous increases in wage inequality in many advanced countries. This is despite the fact that it has turned out difficult to empirically disentangle the effects of globalization on wage inequality from those originating in skill-biased technological change; see Feenstra & Hanson (2003) , Lawrence (2008) , and Krugman (2008) . This paper takes an altogether different perspective on this discussion. It draws attention to how people expect international trade to affect their income situations. Looking through the lens of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, we study empirically whether and to what extent the distributional predictions of free trade are shaping individuals' attitudes towards protection. We find a characteristic pattern which is consistent with endowment-based views of comparative advantage highlighted by the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. Given that individual attitudes towards trade co-determine trade policy outcomes, this potentially has wider implications in a political economy context; see Rodrik (1995) . It also sheds light on the rising demand for protection in developed countries; see Scheve & Slaughter (2007) . Since unskilled labor makes the bulk of the labor force in all countries, but is intensively used in the comparative disadvantage sector only in advanced countries, the Western world would seem prone to a new wave of protectionism. 2 (2009), who argue that high-skilled individuals are more likely to favor free trade due to a general "enlightenment" that comes with a better educational background. Arguably, this enlightenment could date from both a better understanding of the beneficial role of international trade (the aggregate gains from trade) and a general (classroom) stimulation of individuals' openness towards foreign cultures and ideas. With this enlightenment being stronger in rich countries with high-quality education systems, the numbers so far obtained from regression analyses could be subject to poor identification. For this reason, we explicitly capture individuals' economic awareness and their inclinations towards nationalist ideas and carry out baseline estimations of the effects of various aspects of individual enlightenment. Our data are not inconsistent with Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) and Mansfield & Mutz (2009) , but find the factor endowments model to survive all specifications.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical strategy, starting out with a condensed Stolper-Samuelson view on free trade preferences and proceeding with a discussion of the econometric model and our survey data. Section 3 turns to a detailed presentation of our regression results. The final section concludes the paper.
Empirical Strategy
This section presents our empirical approach to studying Stolper-Samuelson effects on free trade preferences. The first subsection explains how the distributional effects of trade liberalization in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model translate into different individual attitudes towards trade. In the second subsection, we set up a simple random utility framework to discuss the relevant econometric issues that arise in our context. In so doing, we slightly modify the existing modelling approach along several dimensions, as will become evident below. The final subsection presents our survey data in some detail. It also looks at whether and how trade preferences correlate with governments' policies and countries' stages of development.
A Stolper-Samuelson View on Free Trade Preferences
The distributional effects of trade policy interventions in a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson setting with two factors of production and two goods can be appropriately discussed by recalling the Stolper-Samuelson theorem; see Stolper & Samuelson (1941) . In its general version the theorem states that protection of domestic import-competing industries will raise the real reward of the scarce factor and lower the real return to the abundant factor. 5 This result emerges from the differentiated zero profit conditions, which in terms of proportional changes are given bŷ p ℓ = θ ℓLŵL + θ ℓHŵH for ℓ = 1, 2,
where a 'hat' indicates a percentage change, the θ ℓj 's are the cost shares of high-and low-skilled labor (with j = H, L), the p ℓ 's are goods prices, and the w j 's are factor prices. 6
Protection, for example through an import tariff, increases the domestic relative price of the imported good. 7 From equation (1), goods price changes are a cost-share weighted average of factor price changes. This implies that thep ℓ 's lie in between theŵ j 's. Let p 1 denote the price of the imported commodity withp 1 > 0 through the imposition of a tariff. The price of the factor which is intensively used in the import-competing sector, say low-skilled labor (i.e. θ 1L > θ 2L ), rises disproportionately compared to the commodity price. By the same logic, high-skilled labor experiences a real income loss, w L >p 1 >p 2 >ŵ H . If we further impose the assumptions necessary to establish the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem -identical technologies and preferences across countries and no factor intensity reversalsit follows that protection harms the country's abundant factor because it is intensively employed in the export industry.
Hypothesis 1. In human-capital-abundant economies, high-skilled individuals favor free trade, while low-skilled individuals oppose free trade. In labor-abundant economies, this conflict of interests is reversed.
One of the captivating features of the Stolper-Samuelson logic is that it reflects changes in a country's factor supply, because inputs are embodied in traded goods. Speaking with Deardorff (1993, p. 7) , "The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem [...] states what might appear obvious to many outside of economics. In its simple form [...] it says that protection helps the scarce factor, or, equivalently, that free trade hurts the scarce factor. [...] [Many politicians and others in the public at large] say that of course trade lowers wages in the United States, since it makes American labor compete with foreign labor that may be paid only a fraction as much." In a wider sense, hypothesis 1 therefore draws on how people expect international trade to affect their incomes. Consequently, any empirical test of this hypothesis is informative as to the extent to which individuals are sensitive towards how an integrated world economy may affect the relative scarcity of their factors, compared to an autarky situation. 8
Hypothesis 1 also implies that whether an individual will oppose or favor protection will entirely depend on the direction, but not the magnitude of the predicted utility change. The prediction for an individual's free trade preference is solely determined by whether the factor is relatively scarce or abundant compared to the rest of the world, essentially because individuals are confronted with a binary choice; see Balistreri (1997) . To see why the degree of relative scarcity of the two factors may also be decisive for preference formation, we incorporate country-pair-specific trading costs.
If trade costs are prohibitively high for some country pairs, each country will only trade with a subset of the other countries. As a result, comparative advantage is no longer defined globally; see Deardorff (2004) . We do not inspect the trade pattern of individual countries here. But it is clear that, other things equal, the probability that a certain factor in a given country is used intensively in the comparative advantage sector is the higher, the higher the relative abundance of this factor in that country. We get the following prediction.
Hypothesis 2. A high-skilled individual is more likely to favor free trade, the higher a country's human-capital-to-labor ratio. The reverse holds true for a low-skilled individual.
Importantly, both hypotheses are independent of whether or not tariffs are prohibitively high. This
is because there is no role for the magnitude of an individual's trade-policy induced utility change, and because the direction of the goods price change does not depend on the degree of protection.
Econometric Model
The fundamental idea in our regression analysis is that trade policy interventions in the form of import tariffs (or the withdrawal thereof) have effects on an individual's utility level due to changes in personal earnings, both in expectation terms. We provide a combined test of hypotheses 1 and 2 and closely follow previous studies in estimating the interaction effect between individual skill and a country's degree of human capital abundance.
For this purpose, we set up the following random utility framework. Mayda & Rodrik (2005) for an empirical application to individual-level trade policy preferences. For an attempt to bring the distributional predictions of the "new new trade theory" with heterogeneous firms and workers to individual survey data see Walter (2010) . For reasons of data availability and conciseness, in this paper we exclusively focus on the explanatory power of the factor endowments model. characteristics such as the political system, the stage of development, or the actual trade policies be summarized in A ic (.) and B c (.), respectively. Decomposing A ic (.) into a function of observables a ic ≡ a(X ic1 , . . . , X icL ) and an unobservable random component α ic , and analogously for B c (.) with b c ≡ b(Z c1 , . . . , Z cK ) and β c , we have
We aim for an estimable equation of (2). An individual's expected income change is unobserved.
Our analysis must therefore take the link between such expectations and individual trade policy preferences as given. Assuming that this link exists, we ask whether parameter estimates on the arguments of E[∆w ic | HOS ](h ic , h c ) can be interpreted as reflecting a Stolper-Samuelson data generating process. Hence, we rewrite equation (2) as
where γ 1 and γ 2 are the parameters of interest and γ c ≡ γ(h c , b c , β c ) is a fixed effect which absorbs both observed and unobserved heterogeneity at the country level.
The left-hand side of equation (3), the expected utility change as such, is an unobservable latent variable. Following existing literature, we construct an individual-specific pro-trade dummy variable from our survey data which serves as an indicator for the sign of the expected change in utility,
). If we additionally impose α ic ∼ Normal(0, 1), we can write an individual's probability of being in favor of free trade, conditional on all explanatory variables, as
. This is the familiar Probit framework, where the main interest in our application is with the effect of individual skill on the probability of being
and how this effect varies with a country's degree of human capital abundance,
This strategy involves a subtle technical issue. In non-linear models, the right hand sides of equations (4) and (5), given the country fixed effects specification in (3), cannot be computed without violating the ceteris paribus assumption of comparative statics analysis. The reason is that, in contrast to linear models, the derivatives (or differences) in (4) and (5) depend on all explanatory variables through Φ ′ (·) and Φ ′′ (·). Hence, estimates of γ c are used to evaluate the standard normal density function and its derivative. Given that this parameter depends on h c , b c , and β c , however, it does not only capture the effect of varying degrees of factor abundance across countries, but also any other (random and non-random) country-specific influence on individual trade policy preferences. 9 Note that our concern equally applies to a wider set of non-linear models with interaction terms.
We consider two simple and straightforward ways to circumvent the problems associated with estimating model (3). The first ignores the underlying latent variable framework and assumes the probability of being in favor of free trade, conditional on all explanatory variables, to be equal to the right-hand side of equation (3),
This is the linear probability model (LPM), which comes at the cost that predictions may lie outside the unit interval.
Still, this is our preferred specification since it explicitly estimates all fixed country effects, which will be shown to explain a considerable part of the variation in trade policy preferences. Then, the left-hand sides of (4) (evaluated at h c = 0) and (5) are equal to γ 1 and γ 2 , respectively. Our second approach keeps the underlying latent variable model and takes care of all arguments of γ(h c , b c , β c ).
The model is then specified as
where η ic = α ic + β c and we assume that η ic ∼ Normal(0, 1). The effect of individual skill is as in equation (4), whereas the interaction effect now becomes
It is only this model that permits a "clean" computation of these effects in a Probit framework.
In both econometric models, the effect of being high-skilled on an individual's attitude towards free trade is a function of the economy's human capital abundance. Hypothesis 1 suggests that highskilled individuals exhibit more protectionist attitudes than low-skilled individuals in labor-abundant countries, and vice versa in human-capital-abundant countries. Hence, we expect that
where h * c is the estimated threshold value which separates human-capital-from labor-abundant countries. Furthermore, hypothesis 2 states that a high-skilled individual's probability of favoring free trade is the higher, the higher his or her country's degree of human capital abundance. A positive cross-derivative,
would support this idea.
Data
We analyze the 2007 wave of the Pew Global Attitudes Project (GAP), an extensive internationally comparable survey data set with detailed information on more than 40,000 individuals worldwide. We drop all individuals who have refused to answer this question, about 5% of the entire sample, and construct a pro-trade dummy variable Y ic which takes on the value one if the respondent's answer is "very good" or "somewhat good" and zero otherwise. We stick to this binary coding throughout the text since it readily eliminates any culturally driven preferences for extreme or moderate responses. These cannot be accounted for by country fixed effects since they come with country-specific dispersions of trade opinions instead of mean shifts. 11
A qualification in our analysis could be that the question does not make the trade policy argument explicit. Yet, a respondent's skeptical view on his or her country's engagement in international trade can be plausibly associated only with the desire of a reduction in trade flows. Since the government is the political institution to pursue a pertinent policy, we argue that the relevant trade policy issue The two pivotal variables in our econometric models are those capturing an individual's skill level h ic and a country's degree of human capital abundance h c . We proxy the former by an individual's educational background, measured through an ordered six-valued variable of educational attainment. 12 We follow established literature in assuming that a higher formal education is associated with a higher probability of being employed in a job with high skill requirements. Existing literature on individual trade policy preferences mostly proxies a country's degree of human capital abundance h c by its GDP per capita. We adopt this approach as well, but we are aware of the fact that GDP per capita is positively correlated with the quality of schooling across countries and the extent to which countries participate in intra-industry trade; see Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) and Beaulieu et al. (2011), respectively. Both relations may alter the effect of individual skill on trade policy preferences and can thus exacerbate the analysis. Therefore, we exploit the fact that each national survey sample is representative for the country's population as a whole and additionally compute explicit measures of factor abundance from within the survey data. More precisely, we define the degree of human capital abundance as each country's weighted average of the individual skill variable. 13 This procedure guarantees the inner consistency of the empirical test to the highest possible extent.
We capture a number of further individual attributes in both the LPM and the Probit model.
In particular, we control for a respondent's age, gender, real income, employment status, and religiousness. In addition, the Probit model identifies country-specific parameters on a bunch of polity and demographic variables from Freedom House and the World Development Indicators (WDI), trade openness (imports plus exports over GDP) from the Penn World Tables (PWT) , human capital abundance from the GAP, and GDP per capita from the WDI. 14 This comes at the cost of potentially introducing an estimation bias from omitted variables at the country level. Since the main interest of this study is with consistent estimates of γ 1 and γ 2 , we consider the country fixed effects specification of the LPM to be our benchmark model. Rodrik (1995) points out that individual trade policy preferences are an input in the political decision process and will therefore co-determine actual trade policies. Our survey data allow for a rough inspection of this claim. Combining information from Global Trade Alert (GTA) and the GAP The figure suggests a relationship between voting bodies' preferences and implemented trade policies consistent with common political economy ideas. Countries in which people hold more tradeskeptical views tend to have governments which are more inclined towards protectionist policies. The linear prediction shows that a one-point increase in the four-valued ordered trade opinion variable is associated with a reduction by 50 protectionist policy measures in the considered time span. This is more than double the median number of registered policy measures. The overall picture is consistent with evidence from Mayda & Rodrik (2005) on the link between trade attitudes and average tariffs, while drawing on a significantly larger set of countries. A natural question is whether this relationship becomes tighter, the more democratic a political regime is. The evidence suggests that the answer is broadly yes; see appendix B. Throughout our analysis, we estimate heteroskedastic robust standard errors to immunize inference against misspecification; see White (1980) . Contrary to our approach, existing literature computes country-cluster robust standard errors. Given our assumptions in section 2.2, stochastic and non-stochastic country effects (β c and b c ) indeed induce correlation among individual observations within country clusters. Whenever we introduce country fixed effects, however, the γ c 's capture any such type of within-country correlation. At any rate, inference based on cluster robust standard errors may be misleading if the number of clusters is small (< 50); see Cameron & Miller (2010) .
Naïve Probit Model
Our naïve regression model does not include the interaction term between individual skill and a country's degree of human capital abundance, h ic × h c . The main motivation for this model is to make two sources of endogeneity visible which existing literature has not been able to address simultaneously. The first is omitted variable bias, and we show individual income, if excluded from the model, to bias estimated coefficients of individual skill upwards. The second has to do with the fact that the estimation sample's country composition exerts a significant influence on estimated coefficients of individual skill, our main variable of interest. In particular, estimation based on a sample excluding countries rich in raw labor (or, alternatively, rich in human capital) suffers from sampling bias.
For our purposes, we split our sample of 47 countries into two subsamples. The first covers the top 50% of countries by their GDP per capita ("higher-income countries"), the second all the remaining countries ("lower-income countries"). Table 1 reports estimation results of the naïve model in a Probit framework.
Columns (1) to (4) are based on the sample with higher-income countries and report marginal effects for the average individual in the estimation sample. First and foremost, we find a positive and robustly significant effect of individual skill on free trade preferences. The probability of being pro-trade increases by more than one-and-a-half percentage points for each discrete "jump" to the next higher level of educational attainment. This effect is significant in both a statistical and an economic sense, given that we distinguish among six education groups. Apart from individual skill, the column (1) model explains trade attitudes by an individual's age, gender, and a comprehensive set of country fixed effects. Our results are in line with those reported in related literature. Specifically, we find that older and female people hold more skeptical views towards trade. 
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-0.020** 0.006 (0.008) (0.007) Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Male 0.019*** 0.017** 0.015** 0.015** 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 (0.006) (0 In columns (2) to (4) we successively control for individual income, religiousness, and employment status, in addition to the other covariates. For our sample of higher-income countries, the skill effect is marginally reduced when controlling for Income in column (2). An increase in income by one percent raises the predicted probability of being pro-trade by more than one-and-a-half percentage points. Being tied to religious beliefs is associated with more protectionist attitudes, but the effect is quantitatively small and not statistically different from zero. The opposite holds true for employed people, who feature a predicted probability of favoring free trade which is two percentage points higher than that of their unemployed peers.
Columns (5) to (8) report regression results for the sample of lower-income countries. The picture is quite different from that based on higher-income countries. For example, we find an enhanced role for individual income with a marginal effect equal to three percentage points. In turn, other individual attributes such as religiousness, gender, and employment status are no significant predictors for free trade preferences. More importantly, the marginal effect of individual skill loses a great deal of its strength, even if we do not control for income; see column (5). Once we do control for it in columns (6) to (8), it vanishes completely.
These results uncover two important points. The first is that estimated coefficients of Skill are biased upwards if the estimation sample mostly comprises rich human capital abundant countries (sampling bias). The second states that individual income is positively correlated with both individual skill and free trade preferences and, if omitted from the model, results in overestimation of the skill effect (omitted variable bias).
HOS Linear Probability Model (Benchmark Regressions)
The preliminary analysis in the previous subsection suggests that the effect of individual skill on free trade preferences correlates with country characteristics. Although the results are quite in line with the Stolper-Samuelson logic, they do not serve as a test of hypotheses 1 and 2. This test is the purpose of this and the following subsection, exploiting the full country coverage of our sample. We first turn to OLS estimates of the interaction effect between individual skill and a country's degree of human capital abundance, as in equation (3). 16 Table 2 contrasts the results of two slightly different approaches, the first of which interacts individual skill h ic with a country's GDP per capita, a proxy variable for human capital abundance h c ; see columns (1) to (4). Our second approach applies a country's weighted mean of individual skill as an explicit and therefore more reliable measure of relative factor endowments; see columns (5) to (8). Intentionally, this entire strategy includes the possibility of obtaining differing results for the two applied measures, which would cast some doubt on the conclusions drawn in previous studies.
We find, however, contrary evidence. Throughout all specifications employed, the estimated coefficient of individual skill has a negative sign while that of the interaction term is positive. The estimation outcome is robust (in a qualitative sense) to using alternative measures of human capital abundance, controlling for individual income and including other individual-level covariates such as religiousness and employment status. Our estimates suggest that the effect of individual skill is an increasing function of a country's degree of human capital abundance. In accordance with hypotheses 1 and 2, high-skilled individuals are more likely to favor free trade than low-skilled individuals, but only if they live in countries with sufficiently high relative levels of human capital. By contrast, in labor-abundant economies it is the low-skilled people who are more inclined towards free trade, other things equal. Our evidence substantially strengthens the findings in Mayda & Rodrik (2005) , Slaughter (2006), and O'Rourke (2006) , because it is based on a "clean" estimation of the interaction effect, explicit endowment information, and a novel extensive data set. To fully grasp the estimation outcome, it is helpful to plot the marginal effect of individual skill on the probability of being pro-trade against a country's relative endowment with human capital.
as well as the 90% confidence intervals for the regressions that correspond to columns (4) and (8) in demonstrates that in countries with relatively low incomes per capita the model predicts a negative skill effect on the probability of favoring free trade. In Ethiopia, the poorest country in the sample, a one-point increase in individual skill exerts a negative and significant impact on free trade preferences in the vicinity of one-and-a-half percentage points. In sufficiently rich countries the effect is in turn positive and statistically significant, considerably exceeding two percentage points for the countries at the upper extreme of the world income distribution. The threshold value separating countries with a predicted positive effect of Skill from those where it is negative is at a log GDP per capita of around 8 (≈ 3,000 Int. Dollars), and therefore significantly below the threshold value that we employed to split our sample in section 3.1 (log GDP per capita of 9.07). 
HOS Probit Model
We now evaluate the robustness of the above findings in a Probit framework. Since the Probit model does no longer allow us to include country fixed effects, two threats to valid inference arise.
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Our polity and demographic variables also carry some interesting implications. Each of these variables reflects aspects of a country's political, institutional, and social setting. Although we think it is natural to assume the formation of policy preferences to be partly governed by this setting, the precise channels through which this occurs are largely unclear. The same holds true, obviously, for their directions of influence. Estimation results in table 3 show most such country characteristics to be significant predictors of individual attitudes towards trade. For example, better functioning governments and better associational and organizational rights are associated with more favorable views on trade. The opposite holds true for higher degrees of political pluralism and participation as well as personal autonomy and individual rights. These findings corroborate our view that further research is needed to better understand why free trade preferences respond differently to different aspects of the institutional architecture in which states and countries are embedded. An interesting step into this direction can be found in Ehrlich (2007) .
Robustness Analysis
Our robustness analysis is based on the LPM and comes in three parts. Subsection 3.4.1 takes care of further individual characteristics, all of which could be correlated with both educational attainment and free trade preferences. In subsection 3.4.2, we address the rather general concern that individuals' policy preferences are rarely driven by economic self-interest. Finally, subsection 3.4.3 asks whether our results are simple artifacts of our coding choice for skill h ic .
Conditioning on Aspects of Individual Enlightenment
Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) argue that education is not a "clean" device for factor ownership, because it could (i) spur people's awareness of the aggregate gains from trade and (ii) make individuals less amenable to nationalist ideas; see also Mayda & Rodrik (2005) . 18 To the extent that these aspects of individual "enlightenment" have a relevant impact on preference formation, our model could suffer -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) Skill × 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** Country Mean of Skill (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Income 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.021*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) Economic Awareness 0.015*** 0.012*** (0.003) (0.003) Informed -0.005 -0.004 (0.005) (0.005) Sociotropic Views 0.010*** 0.007** (0.003) (0.003) Fears of -0.025*** -0.021*** Cultural Spill-Overs (0.005) (0.005) Nationalism 0.007** 0.006* (0.003) (0.003) Fears of -0.074*** -0.072*** Internt'l Competition (0.007) (0.007) Age -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0 In column (2), we add a four-valued ordered proxy variable to capture an individual's economic understanding, which could make individuals responsive to the aggregate gains from trade (Economic Awareness). The survey design confronts respondents with a statement which, we believe, calls for an affirmative reply of a person with some training in economics: "Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following statement. 'Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor.'" The statement nicely encapsulates a basic principle of economics: that "free markets are usually a good way to organize economic activity" but that they "can nonetheless leave sizable disparities in economic well-being." 20 Moreover, it does not refer to issues such as international trade, trade liberalization, or globalization, at least not explicitly. Answers to this question are thus not subject to what has been dubbed justification bias in the literature on opinion polls. This type of bias would arise if individuals were partly using their answers as a means of ex post justification for their (positive or negative) preferences towards trade; see Bonsall et al. (1992) . Economic Awareness enters the model with a significant and positive coefficient, as expected. Its quantitative relevance is relatively high.
Going from the answer category with the lowest value (0 ="completely disagree") to that with the highest value (3 ="completely agree"), an individual's probability of favoring free trade increases by four-and-a-half percentage points.
Column (3) inspects the role of information in attitude formation. Mansfield & Mutz (2009) discuss the possibility that highly educated individuals are more likely to be exposed to relevant information on the (aggregate) economic effects of trade policies. We include a measure of an individual's exposure to international news (Informed ). This variable is based on the following survey question: "Which of the following two statements best describes you: 'I follow INTERNATIONAL news closely ONLY when something important is happening.' OR 'I follow INTERNATIONAL news closely most of the time, whether or not something important is happening' ?" Our assumption is that following international news regularly, independent of whether or not something important is happening, increases an individual's exposure to relevant information (Informed coded one). In line with arguments brought forward in the literature, the variable is indeed positively correlated with an individual's skill level; see table A.2 in the appendix. Yet, our regression results suggest that exposure to information does not exert any significant impact on trade policy preferences.
In the spirit of Hainmueller & Hiscox (2006) , Mansfield & Mutz (2009) argue that material selfinterest is less important for trade attitudes than perceptions of the effects of trade on the economy as a whole. We will try to take care of a similar concern below. Here we ask whether the extent to which individuals hold sociotropic views makes a difference for perceptions of international trade.
An individual's answer to the following survey question may yield informative insights in this regard:
"Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following statement. 'Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.'" The variable Sociotropic Views takes on integer values from (0) "completely disagree" to (3) "completely agree". The underlying statement posits a trade-off between environmental protection, a durable public good generating benefits for many years, and economic growth and the availability of jobs, the latter securing personal income. We argue that a tendency towards environmental protection reveals sociotropic attitudes. Regression results in column (4) are consistent with this interpretation, reporting a positive and significant coefficient of Sociotropic Views.
We next turn to aspects of nationalist attitudes. Column (5) controls for fears that increasing globalization may crowd out local traditions. We exploit the following survey information: "I am going to read some phrases which have opposite meanings. Tell me which comes closer to describing your views. 'It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading around the world.' -'It's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading around the world.'" The dichotomous variable Column (6) incorporates feelings of national superiority through a four-valued ordered variable constructed from individual responses towards the following statement (Nationalism): "As I read another list of statements, for each one, please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with it. 'Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others.'" Our estimates reveal that "nationalist" people are, at first sight surprisingly, more likely to be pro-trade. This finding runs opposite to the intuition that nationalist sentiments should foster preferences for isolationist policies. On the other hand, feelings of national superiority may mitigate worries that the domestic economy is not able to cope with foreign competition. Seen in this light, the positive albeit small coefficient estimate on Nationalism is quite intuitive.
The model in column (7) takes a closer look at the extent to which individuals are afraid of negative economy-wide effects from international competition. The binary variable Fears of International Competition is based on the following survey question: "Turning to China, overall do you think that China's growing economy is a good thing or a bad thing for our country?" Including this variable in the model is different from controlling for economic awareness, since there are arguments for both why economic growth of one country may be good or bad for another country. Nevertheless, we expect people who perceive another country's growth as a threat rather than an opportunity to be more likely to retain protectionist attitudes. Our results strikingly confirm this expectation. Individuals who fear negative repercussions from China's growing economy have a significantly lower probability of favoring free trade. The quantitative impact is huge and amounts to a fall in predicted probability of more than seven percentage points.
We have so far separately augmented the model by each of the above mentioned control variables in columns (2) to (7) . All qualitative results survive if we estimate a more encompassing model which conditions on all aspects of individual enlightenment simultaneously; see column (8). These findings are interesting in their own right. They give quite strong support to the idea that various aspects of individual enlightenment exist, and that most of them are significantly linked to individual trade policy preferences. However, our main focus is on parameter estimates for Skill and its interaction with Country Mean of Skill. These do not change in any significant way, relative to the baseline specification in column (1). We therefore conclude that the Stolper-Samuelson result is independent of individuals' economic awareness and their openness towards foreign cultures and ideas.
Economic Self-Interest versus Social Values and Identity
There is an ongoing debate among economists, sociologists, and political scientists about the roles played by social values and identity and, juxtaposed, pure material self-interest in shaping individual political behavior. The literature as it currently stands takes the view that both factors are potentially important, depending on how clear-cut the policy alternatives and implications are and how long the time horizon is to which these apply; see Chong et al. (2001) , , and Hunt et al.
(2010) as well as the references cited there. Admittedly, this paper takes an extreme view on this issue. Recall that a prerequisite for free trade preferences to emerge along the lines of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model is that individuals prefer a certain policy choice over another if it brings about a greater (expected) personal income. Given the nature of our survey data, we are not in a position to fully assess the reliability of this prerequisite. Yet, we can make an important step into this direction. The point of departure is the idea that in individual decision making the weight put on material self-interest is larger for some individuals than for others. We expect this weight to broadly correlate with the extent to which hypotheses 1 and 2 are borne out by the data. The challenge is to find a sound signalling device from which we can systematically exploit this heterogeneity. Our view is that the absence of economic and financial concerns is such a device because it erodes the need for individuals to base their decisions on mere pocketbook considerations.
Our strategy is to divide the entire sample into two groups, the first of which includes only individuals who express economic and/or financial concerns and the second all the remaining individuals.
This distinction is based on answers to the following question in the GAP survey: "What do you think is the most important problem facing you and your family today?" The question is open in the sense that pollers do not present or read out a list with possible answers to individuals. A maximum of three answers is allowed, and each of them is subsequently assigned to one of the following categories: "Economic/financial problems", "Health", "Education and children", "Housing", "Social relations", "Work", "Transportation", "Crime", "Problems related to government", "Terrorism and war", "Other". Each category comprises two to six pre-specified subcategories plus a "residual" group for answers which do not fit into any one of the given subcategories. We identify subcategories referring to problems which are relevant from a very economic/financial perspective and classify individuals whose answers fall into at least one such subcategory as "economically/financially concerned". These subcategories are "Low wages", "Unemployment", "Poverty", "Other economic/financial problems", and "Lack of good jobs". -0.017** -0.015** -0.015** -0.022*** -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) Skill × 0.008** 0.007** 0.007** 0.009** 0.007** 0.008** 0.008** 0.007* Country Mean of Skill (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) Income 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015** (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) Religious -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.012 -0.012 -0.016* (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) Unemployed 0.003 0.007 -0.008 -0.008 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) Age -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ( With this procedure, we are left with roughly 20,000 individual observations with economic and/or financial concerns and 15,000 without. One might be tempted to expect the skill distribution to draw a sharp line between the two groups of individuals, but the evidence proves contrary. For example, close to one sixth of individuals who express economic and/or financial concerns have exposure to at least some university education, as opposed to 23 percent for the other group. We run the same regressions separately on each of the two subsamples, estimating the effect of Skill and its interaction with Country Mean of Skill and bringing in different sets of control variables; see table 5. As in the previous subsection, answers to the above survey question are not applicable for a relevant subset of countries in the GAP. Thus, we again end up with a maximum number of 38 countries in the estimation sample.
We find the estimates based on the sample with "economically/financially concerned" individuals to neatly reflect the Stolper-Samuelson logic; see columns (1) to (4). The quantitative implications are similar to those in the previous subsection, at least for models in which we use the same set of control variables as in our benchmark regressions. Column (4) applies a specification similar to that in column (8) of table 4, controlling for all aspects of individual enlightenment. In this model, the predicted negative skill effect extends to a larger set of countries, compared to our benchmark regressions in section 3.2. This set now includes labor-abundant China, for example. Estimates on the subsample with individuals who do not express economic and/or financial concerns, while similar with respect to all control variables, yield complementary insights; see columns (5) to (8). In particular, the data do not confirm hypothesis 1 as there is no country in the sample for which a given positive change in Skill entails a significant decline in individual support for free trade. A careful interpretation of these findings could be that the factor endowments model has significant explanatory power in understanding trade attitudes of individuals whose concerns about their personal financial situation loom large in their preference structures. With other factors such as social values and identity gaining relative importance in individual decision making, this explanatory power is reduced.
Skill Group-Specific Effects on Free Trade Preferences
To assess whether and to what extent our previous results are due to the specific coding of Skill and Country Mean of Skill, we estimate the same model for alternative measures of both individual skill and a country's relative endowment with human capital. In so doing, we pay attention to the fact that values on Skill reflect an ordinal instead of a cardinal scale. Indeed, there is no quantifiable distance between any two educational categories, although the variable definition suggests there is (and that it is the same between any two adjacent categories).
We first allow for skill group-specific effects on free trade preferences. By skill groups we mean groups of individuals with the same educational background, where we represent each of the six strictly hierarchical classes of educational attainment by a unique skill group, enumerated from zero to five. Individual-specific indicator variables Skill Group 1 to Skill Group 5 then take on the value one if the individual belongs to the corresponding skill group and zero otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) in table 6 report estimation results for regressions in which we employ these indicator variables and their interactions with Country Mean of Skill as exogenous variables. Individuals with no formal or incomplete primary education (Skill Group 0 ) form the omitted category against which estimated skill group-specific effects and the interactions are to be interpreted. In light of hypotheses 1 and 2 we expect each skill group effect on free trade preferences to exhibit the same qualitative non-linearity as above: compared to the lowest skill group, any other skill group should have a lower probability of favoring free trade in labor-abundant economies and a higher probability in human-capital-abundant countries. Furthermore, the quantitative implications (both positive and negative) should be the larger in absolute size, the higher the skill group category of educational attainment. This follows from the assumption that the probability of holding a high-skilled occupation is the higher, the higher the skill category. Indeed, point estimates of the coefficients in table 6 suggest that the main effects of all skill groups are negative and the interaction effects positive. As before, the quantitative implications of Figure   4 makes visible how the skill group effects vary with a country's relative endowment with human capital. It shows that the threshold value of relative factor abundance is strikingly similar for the top four skill groups (h * c ≈ 2). Furthermore, the straight lines depicting predicted changes in trade attitudes rotate left around this threshold value for higher levels of educational attainment. 21 We therefore interpret the results of this more flexible estimation approach as fully compatible with the Stolper-Samuelson logic.
As a final robustness check, in columns (3) and (4) in table 6 we interact skill group dummy variables with the country median of Skill instead of the country average. We do so because the median may be more suitable for data on an ordinal scale and because it is less sensitive to outliers.
The use of this measure does not alter our estimation results in any remarkable way.
Conclusion
Motivated by the incidence of the growing North-South share in world trade and the rising demand for protection in high-income countries, this paper adds an empirical piece to the literature on individual attitudes towards trade. Using a wide cross section of 47 countries from all over the world, we primarily focus on the interplay between individual factor ownership and countries' relative factor endowments. Our paper shows how the linear probability model can be used to straightforwardly examine how this interplay is shaping free trade preferences, and that this approach has relevant advantages over the commonly applied Probit model. 
A Individual and Country Data
This appendix provides summary statistics, coding information, and data sources for all variables used in this paper. s country] and other countries -do you think it is a very good thing, somewhat good, somewhat bad or a very bad thing for our country?"; coded (1) "very good" or "somewhat good", (0) "somewhat bad" or "very bad". Trade Opinion Survey question as above; coded (3) "very good", (2) "somewhat good", (1) "somewhat bad", and (0) "very bad". Age
Respondent's age in years.
Male
Coded (1) male, (0) female.
Skill
Respondent's educational attainment. Coded (0) no formal or incomplete primary education, (1) complete primary education, (2) incomplete secondary education (technical/vocational), (3) complete secondary education (technical/vocational) / incomplete secondary education (university-preparatory) / complete secondary education (university-preparatory), (4) some university education (without degree), and (5) university education (with degree). Skill Group dummy variables (1 to 5) represent the top five categories of educational attainment, each capturing a single category in a binary way. There is some cross-country heterogeneity in the survey categories of educational attainment. More information on how we map country-specific groups of educational attainment into the above hierarchical structure is available upon request.
Income
Log of monthly real income. Survey respondents sort themselves into income groups, based on (countryspecific) lists of incomes. As a general rule, we compute individual income as the middle value of the income interval chosen by the individual, adjusted by PPP conversion factors from the World Development Indicators, expressed in logs, and, if necessary, converted to a monthly basis. More detailed information on this procedure is available upon request.
Unemployed
Coded (1) unemployed/not employed, (0) employed. Religious "Which one of these comes closest to your opinion, number 1 or number 2?"; coded (1) "Number 2 -It is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values"/NA/refused, (0) "Number 1 -It is not necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values". Economic Awareness "Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following statement. 'Most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich and some are poor'"; coded (0) "completely disagree", (1) "disagree", (2) "agree", (3) "completely agree". Informed "Which of the following two statements best describes you: 'I follow INTERNATIONAL news closely ONLY when something important is happening' OR 'I follow INTERNATIONAL news closely most of the time, whether or not something important is happening' ?"; coded (1) "Most of the time, whether or not something important is happening", (0) "Only when something important is happening". Sociotropic Views "Please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the following statement. 'Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs.'"; coded (0) "completely disagree", (1) "mostly disagree", (2) "mostly agree", (3) "completely agree". Fears of Cultural Spill-Overs "I am going to read some phrases which have opposite meanings. Tell me which comes closer to describing your views."; coded (1) "It's bad that American ideas and customs are spreading around the world", (0) "It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading around the world". Nationalism "As I read another list of statements, for each one, please tell me whether you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with it. 'Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others.'"; coded (0) "completely disagree", (1) "mostly disagree", (2) "mostly agree", (3) "completely agree". Fears of International Competition "Turning to China, overall do you think that China's growing economy is a good thing or a bad thing for our country?"; coded (1) "bad thing", (0) "good thing". † See table A.1 for summary statistics on all variables. All information come from the GAP survey data. 
II

B Transmission of Preferences to Policies
This appendix asks whether the transmission of people's trade preferences into governments' policy measures is correlated with a country's political regime. To answer this question, we run a regression of the following form on the cross-sectional sample of 47 countries in the GAP:
where PPM c is the Global Trade Alert count of protectionist policy measures in country c between May 01, 2009, and October 31, 2010, TRADEOP c is the country-average of the four-valued ordered trade opinion variable from the GAP, DEMO c is a democracy index from the Economist Intelligence Unit as of 2006, and ǫ c is the error term; see appendix A for details on these variables. Figure io p ia R u s s ia K e n y a U g a n d a T a n z a n ia G h a n a S e n e g a l V e n e z u e la T u r k e y L e b a n o n together with the corresponding confidence intervals based on estimation of robust standard errors.
Point estimates from this regression exercise suggest that the link between free trade preferences and governments' policy measures is strongest for Sweden, the country with the highest democracy index in the estimation sample. In turn, Chinese trade policy seems to be independent of people's attitudes towards trade.
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